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Introduction 
Every day, approximately 5,500 detained immigrant workers pick 
up mops, brooms, pots, pans, spatulas, shovels, jackhammers, and 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Voluntary Work Program 
1288 
hair trimmers to take part in the “Voluntary Work Program”1—a 
detention center program that provides detained immigrants with 
“opportunities to work and earn money while confined.”2 This 
program, marketed to the public as a way to reduce the “negative 
impact of confinement,”3 serves a dual purpose: to undercut the 
American labor market and bolster profits within the private prison 
industry. 
Although Congress may determine the compensation rate for the 
Voluntary Work Program “from time to time,” the pay scale for de-
tained immigrant workers has remained the same since its codification 
in the 1978 Appropriations Act.4 This antiquated piece of legislation 
permits payment at rates as low as $1.00 a day.5 As such, immigrant 
detention centers may compensate workers at $0.13 an hour for as 
many as eight working hours a day—a cost-saving mechanism that 
many detention centers welcome. Rather than employ workers from 
the American workforce, who would require minimum wage payments 
of at least $7.25 per hour,6 detention centers use the Voluntary Work 
Program to save approximately $40 million a year on labor costs.7 
 
1. Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor, N.Y. Times 
(May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/using-jailed-
migrants-as-a-pool-of-cheap-labor.html [https://perma.cc/5Z7G-M7SU]. 
2. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Performance-Based National 
Detention Standards 2011, at 382 (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNV4-X88Z] 
[hereinafter PBNDS]. 
3. Id. 
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d) (2012). 
5. Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-86, 91 
Stat. 419, 426 (1977). 
6. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #14: Coverage Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (2009), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/ 
compliance/whdfs14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZAG-AE39] (providing general 
information concerning the coverage of the FLSA, including minimum wage 
requirements). 
7. Urbina, supra note 1. There are claims, however, that the government under-
estimates the scope of the Voluntary Work Program. Id. An independent 
review of ICE contracts with detention centers suggests that approximately 
135,000 detained immigrants participate in the Voluntary Work Program 
every year, saving the government and private prison operators as much as 
$200 million in wages that, otherwise, would be used to employ ordinary 
workers from the American workforce. Id. As such, some argue that the 
federal government, in employing thousands of detained immigrant workers, 
is “the biggest employer of undocumented immigrants in the country.” 
Alexandra Starr, At Low Pay, Government Hires Immigrants Held at 
Detention Centers, Nat’l Pub. Radio (July 23, 2015, 5:11 AM), http:// 
www.npr.org/2015/07/23/425511981/at-low-pay-government-hires-
immigrants-held-at-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/V6DK-CFK2]. 
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This Note examines the Voluntary Work Program in for-profit de-
tention centers across the country.8 It argues that the Voluntary 
Work Program violates contemporary labor laws, which emphatically 
prohibit employers from hiring undocumented immigrants. Ultimately, 
this Note proposes that detained immigrant workers qualify as “em-
ployees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and are entitled 
to its protections. 
Part I of this Note presents the creation and implementation of 
the Voluntary Work Program in immigrant detention centers. Part II 
explores the ways immigrant detention centers benefit from cheap 
labor through the Voluntary Work Program. It also explores the 
private prison industry’s attempts to influence U.S. immigration 
policy to maintain detention rates that fully staff the Voluntary Work 
Program. Part III considers labor laws—including the FLSA and the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)—that regulate 
the immigrant workforce and prohibit employers from engaging in 
unfair labor practices. Lastly, Part IV challenges the reasoning behind 
decisions to deny FLSA protections to detained immigrant workers. 
While courts have historically relied on an analogy between 
immigrant detainees and ordinary prisoners as the basis for their 
analysis, this Note proposes other analogies that more closely reflect 
the nuances of detained immigrant workers and serve as better 
comparators to determine employment status under the FLSA. 
Ultimately, this Note rejects comparisons between detained 
immigrants and ordinary prisoners. Instead, it encourages courts to 
apply the economic realities test to find that detained immigrant 
workers are “employees” under the FLSA and, therefore, are entitled 
to compensation at no less than the prevailing minimum wage. 
I. The Voluntary Work Program:  
Legislative Evolution and Industry Adoption 
The Voluntary Work Program operates in immigrant detention 
centers across the country to support the “essential operations and 
 
8. Although this Note focuses on privately owned and operated detention facili-
ties, the Voluntary Work Program exists in government-operated detention 
centers as well. Urbina, supra note 1. There are approximately 250 
immigrant detention facilities nationwide, some operated through 
partnerships with state and local jails, some through contracts with private 
companies, and others that are operated by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement itself. Immigration Detention, Lutheran Immigr. and 
Refugee Serv., http:// 
lirs.org/immigrationdetention/ [https://perma.cc/LET7-UVLK] (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2017). The Voluntary Work Program operates at approximately 55 
of the 250 immigrant detention centers. Urbina, supra note 1. Of these 55 
detention centers that benefit from detained immigrant labor, 34 of them 
are privately owned, while the other 21 are government operated. Id. 
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services” of immigrant detention.9 The government frames the 
program as a way to reduce the “negative impact of confinement . . . 
through decreased idleness, improved morale and fewer disciplinary 
incidents.”10 But while the government presents the Voluntary Work 
Program as a benefit to detainees, the true beneficiaries are prison 
operators, who receive cheap labor to maintain immigrant detention 
facilities.11 This in-house employment scheme allows detention facili-
ties to avoid recruiting from the traditional labor market—thereby 
reducing operational costs and increasing industry profits.12 In doing 
so, the Voluntary Work Program contributes to the substandard 
living conditions found in immigrant detention centers,13 while 
padding the multi-million dollar pockets of the private prison 
industry.14 
A. The Codification of the “Dollar-a-Day” Provision 
The Voluntary Work Program is codified in Section 1555 of Title 
8 of the United States Code, which provides that the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) may use its appropriations to provide 
“payment of allowances (at such rate as may be specified from time to 
time in the appropriation Act involved) to aliens, while held in 
custody under the immigration laws, for work performed.”15 Despite 
this statutory language that encourages—and, arguably, requires—
Congress to review and revise payment allowances “from time to 
time,” Congress has not adjusted the minimum rate of compensation 
 
9. PBNDS, supra note 2, at 382. 
10. Id. 
11. See Urbina, supra note 1 (noting the financial benefits that the Voluntary 
Work Program offers to private prison companies). 
12. Id. 
13. See generally Tom K. Wong, Rights, Deportation, and Detention in 
the Age of Immigration Control 109–43 (Stanford Univ. Press 2015) 
(describing the substandard living conditions and inhumane treatment of 
detainees in immigrant detention centers). 
14. See generally Noah D. Zats, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison 
Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relations, 61 Vand. L. 
Rev. 857, 867–74 (2008) (explaining the financial benefits that inmate work 
programs provide to the private prison industry). 
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d) (2012). The Immigration and Naturalization Service over-
saw U.S. immigration and naturalization until 2003 when its functions were 
divided into three separate agencies under the Department of Homeland 
Security: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). Our History, U.S. Citizenship and & Immigr. Serv. 
(May 25, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https:// 
perma.cc/6UJC-TWMF]. 
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in over thirty-five years, with the Appropriations Act of 1978 
continuing to serve as the legal basis for the “dollar-a-day” 
provision,16 and permitting “payment of allowances (at a rate not in 
excess of $1 per day) to aliens, while held in custody under the 
immigration laws, for work performed.”17 
Based on this archaic piece of legislation, the private prison indus-
try (as well as its government-operated associates) finds legal justifi-
cation for compensating detainees with as little as $0.13 an hour. In 
fact, in defending its use of low-cost labor under the Voluntary Work 
Program, the GEO Group, Inc., a leading corporation in the private 
prison industry, explained, “The voluntary work program at immigra-
tion facilities as well as the wage rates and standards associated with 
the program are set by the federal government.”18 As such, while Con-
gress ignores its obligation to re-determine pay rates for the 
Voluntary Work Program, the GEO Group and other private prison 
operators may lawfully compensate detained immigrant workers at 
subminimum wages.19 
B. Implementing the Voluntary Work Program 
Without congressional oversight, Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE), the division of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) responsible for enforcing immigration laws within the 
interior of the United States, maintains independent authority to 
define the character of the Voluntary Work Program.20 ICE’s 
Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) provide 
agency guidance on the Voluntary Work Program and specifies the 
 
16. See Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immi-
gration Jail, from 1943 to Present, 29 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 391, 428–30 
(2014) (discussing the legislative basis for the Voluntary Work Program’s 
compensation policy). 
17. Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-86, 91 
Stat. 419, 426 (1978). 
18. See Rachel Estabrook, Colorado Immigrant Detainees’ Labor Claims May 
be Part of National Issue, Colo. Pub. Radio (Oct. 27, 2014), http:// 
www.cpr.org/news/story/colorado-immigrant-detainees-labor-claims-may-be-
part-national-issue [https://perma.cc/8W5M-TWMR] (interviewing detained 
immigrant workers in an immigrant detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, 
where detainees are paid as little as one dollar a day for work under the 
Voluntary Work Program). 
19. Id. (quoting a statement from the GEO Group that detention center work 
programs are in compliance with administrative regulations and federal 
laws). 
20. See Alison Siskin, Andorra Bruno, Blas Nunez-Neto, Lisa M. 
Seghetti & Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration Enforcement Within 
the United States 8 (Bruno T. Isenberg ed. 2007) (explaining the different 
government agencies responsible for maintaining immigration laws). 
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program’s purpose, standards, and expected outcomes.21 According to 
the most recent version of the PBNDS, “detainees who are physically 
and mentally able to work shall be provided the opportunity to 
participate in a voluntary work program.”22 Importantly, despite the 
use of binding language (e.g., “shall”), the PBNDS are 
unenforceable,23 and detention facilities may decide whether or not to 
adopt the provisions.24 
In some respects, the PBNDS resemble an employee handbook, 
detailing selection criteria for the Voluntary Work Program, as well as 
safety precautions and prohibitions against discrimination.25 In other 
respects, however, the PBNDS are vague and ambiguous, leaving 
detention centers free to shape the Voluntary Work Program in ways 
that benefit internal operations. Although the PBNDS do not specify 
the type of work that detainees perform under the Voluntary Work 
Program, they do differentiate the program’s work assignments from 
 
21. PBNDS, supra note 2, at 382–87. 
22. Id. at 383. 
23. See Alexandra (Sachi) Cole, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Prisoners 
of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia 32 (Azadeh 
Shahshahani, ed. 2012), http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline 
/42/244/ [https://perma.cc/4N8N-2JWT] (“Although ICE’s standards are 
non-binding, they are promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security 
and set forth aspirational standards for every immigration detention fa-
cility.”). Government-owned detention centers, however, are required to 
comply with the PBNDS. U.S. Civil Rights Comm’n, With Liberty 
and Justice for All: The State of Civil Rights at Immigration 
Detention Facilities 29 (2015), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_ 
Enforcement_Report2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMR8-PJP5]. Still, it re-
mains disputed whether ICE-owned facilities truly comply with the PBNDS. 
Id. at 31–32. 
24. See Sarah Dávila-Ruhaak, ICE’s New Policy on Segregation and the Con-
tinuing Use of Solitary Confinement Within the Context of International 
Human Rights, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1433, 1440–41 (2014) (describing 
the failure of immigrant detention facilities to adopt certain PBNDS, 
including provisions related to solitary confinement); see also Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, Holiday on ICE: The U.S. Department of Home-
land Security’s New Immigration Detention Standards 14 (2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_detention_
standards_hearing_statement_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDG8-FQ38] 
(explaining the deficiencies of the PBNDS). 
25. If viewed as an employee handbook, the PBNDS raise interesting questions 
concerning whether or not the document constitutes a contract between the 
employer (the detention facility) and the employee (the detained immigrant 
worker), and what effect it may have on their employment relationship. Most 
courts recognize that employee manuals may function as unilateral 
contracts. See Samuel Estreicher & Michael C. Harper, Cases and 
Materials on Employment Law 46–64 (3d ed. 2008) (describing 
employee handbooks and personnel manuals as binding unilateral contacts). 
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those that are required of all detainees.26 For instance, personal 
housekeeping requirements, expected of all detainees, consist of 
making beds, stacking loose papers, and keeping the floor free of 
debris.27 ICE spokespersons emphasize that participants in the 
Voluntary Work Program perform work beyond personal 
housekeeping that directly contributes to institutional operations.28 
But without more detailed information from the individual deten-
tion facilities concerning the nature of the Voluntary Work Program, 
the actual character of the Voluntary Work Program relies on 
firsthand reports from inside the detention centers. At the Stewart 
Detention Center, an immigrant detention center in Lumpkin, 
Georgia, owned by Corrections Corporation of America with a 
capacity of 1,752 detainees,29 detainees reported jobs including 
cleaning up cells, working in the kitchen, and performing barber 
services.30 At the Denver Contract Detention Center, an immigrant 
detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, operated by the GEO Group, 
detainees explained that their duties involved waking up at 5:00 a.m. 
to serve meals, clean showers, give haircuts, and perform outdoor 
maintenance.31 
Of particular concern, some detainees report that the Voluntary 
Work Program is not truly “voluntary” and allege that they are 
victims of forced labor.32 For instance, one detainee in the Steward 
Detention Center explained that he was disciplined and placed in a 
segregated unit for refusing to work.33 Others alleged being threatened 
with “the hole” if they did not work fast enough.34 Even worse, one 
 
26. PBNDS, supra note 2, at 383. 
27. Id. 
28. See Urbina, supra note 1 (describing an ICE spokeswoman’s response to 
claims of exploitation of detained immigrant labor under the Voluntary 
Work Program). 
29. Stewart Detention Center, Corrections Corp. of Am., https://www. 
cca.com/facilities/stewart-detention-center [https://perma.cc/A8F7-2JHY] 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
30. See Cole, supra note 23, at 57 (providing testimonies from detained immi-
grants concerning their experience as workers in the Voluntary Work Pro-
gram in the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia). 
31. See Estabrook, supra note 18 (reporting on the Voluntary Work Program 
at a GEO-owned immigrant detention center in Aurora, Colorado). 
32. See Anita Sinha, Slavery by Another Name: “Voluntary” Immigrant De-
tainee Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 
36–42 (2015) (considering constitutional violations resulting from coercive 
and forced labor under the Voluntary Work Program). 
33. Cole, supra note 23, at 58. 
34. Id. 
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detainee in the Steward Detention Center suffered two leg injuries 
while working in the detention center’s kitchen.35 Despite medical 
orders to rest and the fact that the detainee was confined to crutches, 
the detention center guards forced him to continue working.36 These 
personal accounts of forced labor suggest that the Voluntary Work 
Program facilitates an abusive work environment, compromising the 
health and well-being of immigrant detainees. 
At the same time, however, some detainees value the opportunity 
to participate in the Voluntary Work Program, claiming that it serves 
as an outlet to reduce the stress and boredom of immigrant 
detention.37 Further, they explain, the Voluntary Work Program 
allows detainees to develop positive relationships with facility 
operators and earn money to spend at the commissary.38 For some, 
therefore, the Voluntary Work Program provides a small piece of 
normalcy in an otherwise dark and distorted system. This suggests 
that the Voluntary Work Program could be a positive feature of 
immigrant detention if it is properly regulated and managed in 
compliance with contemporary labor laws.39 
II. The Growth and Privatization of  
Immigrant Detention 
In the run-up to the 2016 presidential primaries, then-presidential-
hopeful Senator Bernie Sanders, along with Congressmen from Minne-
sota, Arizona, and Illinois, introduced a bill40 to “end the private 
prison racket.”41 Among other provisions to mitigate the power of the 
for-profit prison industry, the Justice Is Not For Sale Act targets 
 
35. Id. at 61. 
36. Id. at 58. 
37. See Sinha, supra note 32, at 33 (explaining the benefits and detriments of 
the Voluntary Work Program). 
38. Id. Although detained immigrant workers may spend their earnings at the 
detention facility’s commissary, the price of goods is often significantly in-
flated in order to further maximize industry profits. See Molly Hennessy-
Fiske, Paid $1 to $3 a Day, Unauthorized Immigrants Keep Family Deten-
tion Centers Running, L.A. Times (Aug. 3, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www. 
latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-detention-immigration-workers-20150 
803-story.html [https://perma.cc/9NX9-5BDX] (describing the inflated cost 
of goods at immigrant detention center commissaries). 
39. Id. 
40. S. 2054, 114th Cong. (2015). 
41. Press Release, Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sanders, House Leaders Introduce Bill 
to Ban Private Prisons (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.sanders.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/press-releases/sanders-house-leaders-introduce-bill-to-ban-private-
prisons [https://perma.cc/HJ32-JDK5].  
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ICE’s reliance on private companies to serve its law enforcement 
needs. Specifically, the bill: (1) prohibits ICE from contracting with 
private companies, (2) terminates requirements instructing ICE to 
detain 34,000 immigrants (the so-called “Bed Mandate” or “Bed 
Quota”), (3) improves government oversight over immigrant 
detention centers, and (4) ends immigrant family detention.42 This 
not-so-subtle assault on the for-profit prison industry reflects renewed 
efforts to reform immigrant detention to “uphold justice—not to 
house innocent refugees or feed the greed of corporate interests.”43 
This bill, however, remains stalled in the Senate, where Congress has 
not taken any action to pass the measure since it referred the bill to 
the Committee on the Judiciary in September 2015.44 And despite 
efforts to reduce ICE’s reliance on for-profit detention centers, private 
detention centers remain a multibillion-dollar industry that relies on 
cheap labor from the Voluntary Work Program.45 
A. Immigration Enforcement and Reliance on Immigrant Detention 
Immigrant detention first emerged as a mechanism to protect 
public health and ensure orderly immigration processing.46 Over time, 
 
42. Id. The Obama administration introduced family detention in 2014 to detain 
asylum-seeking families fleeing violence in Central America. Featured Issue: 
Family Detention, Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n (Mar. 1, 2016), http:// 
www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/enforcement/detention [https://perma.cc/ 
89RH-NNX3]. Congressional pushback against family detention argued 
that the “prolonged detention of asylum-seeking mothers and children who 
pose no flight risk or danger to the community is unacceptable and goes 
against our most fundamental values.” Letter from Thirty-Three U.S. 
Senators to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 
2015), https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/6.1.15_-__family_detention 
_letter_to_secretary_johnson_cc_sarah_saldana.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
636L-CF87]. 
43. See Press Release, supra note 41 (announcing the introduction of the Justice 
is Not For Sale Act in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives). 
44. All Actions, All Bill Information (Except Text) for S.2054—Justice is Not 
For Sale Act of 2015, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
114th-congress/senate-bill/2054/all-info#all-actions [https://perma.cc/373R-
U4H7] (last visited May 9, 2017). 
45. The Justice is Not For Sale Act was assigned to a congressional committee 
on September 17, 2015, and remains stalled in committee today, with some 
government tracking analysts giving it a “1% chance of being enacted.” S. 
2054: Justice is Not For Sale Act of 2015, GovTrack, https://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2054#. [https://perma.cc/6RF5-U6WX] 
(last visited July 24, 2016). 
46. See Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention 
Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody,” 48 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 879, 885 (2015) (describing public policy concerns that led to the 
codification of mandatory immigrant detention policies). 
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however, public concerns over national security became the primary 
justification for mass detention.47 Today’s immigrant detention system 
is largely based on a 1988 congressional statute—and its successive 
iterations—that supports mass immigrant detention to protect the 
American economy, reduce crime, and prevent terrorism.48 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created the first mandatory de-
tention scheme, requiring detention of any noncitizen convicted of an 
“aggravated felony.”49 Despite U.S. Department of Justice concerns 
that it lacked the resources to detain “each and every criminal alien 
until removal can be effected,”50 Congress remained fixed on 
expanding mandatory detention requirements. In 1996, Congress 
terminated discretionary release of certain criminal offenders51—many 
of whom, at one point or another, were lawfully admitted to the 
United States.52 
1. Mandatory Detention Under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) cod-
ifies mandatory detention.53 This provision states that the Attorney 
General “shall take into custody” noncitizens who commit a 
generalized and expansive list of offenses, but mostly crimes involving 
moral turpitude, drug offenses, or arriving aliens in removal 
 
47. See id. at 887–88 (describing security concerns related to political dissidents 
and communism as the basis for immigrant detention in the early to mid-
twentieth century). 
48. Id. at 890.  
49. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(2), 102 Stat. 
4469, 4470 (1988).  
50. See Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d 
Cong. 100 (1993) (explaining prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforce-
ment). 
51. Under the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Con-
gress increased its reliance on mandatory detention, rapidly increasing the 
number of detained immigrants from 8,500 in 1996 to 16,000 in 1998. 
Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
https://www.aclu.org/analysis-immigration-detention-policies [https://perma 
.cc/NPC4-DM9F] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). See also Torrey, supra note 
46, at 895 (describing Congress’s decision to implement mandatory detention 
policies, despite administrative preferences for prosecutorial discretion). 
52. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697–99 (2001) (recognizing the use 
of mandatory detention as a means to protect public safety, but holding 
that a noncitizen may only be detained for a “reasonable” period of time). 
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody 
any alien who . . . .”). 
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proceedings.54 Mandatory detention, combined with strict federal 
sentencing guidelines, maintains a constant flow of immigrants in 
detention facilities across the country. For example, Congress 
expanded the definition of the term “aggravated felony,” specifically 
as it relates to immigration law, to expand the reach of mandatory 
detention, which requires detention of noncitizens convicted of 
aggravated felonies.55 Although many of these detainees have lived 
lawfully in the United States and maintain significant community ties, 
they are ineligible for most forms of discretionary relief and are held 
in detention—without eligibility for bond—for the duration of their 
immigration proceedings.56 Although prosecutorial discretion is an 
accepted component of immigration law, Section 236(c) suggests that 
“mandatory detention is the rule while discretionary release is the 
narrow exception.”57 
2. Immigrant Detention Quotas and the “Bed Mandate” 
First introduced under the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2010,58 the “bed mandate” or “bed quota” 
refers to the number of beds that DHS must have available in 
immigrant detention facilities across the country.59 This mandate, 
reaffirmed in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
 
54. Id. An arriving alien is an applicant for admission to the United States who 
comes or attempts to come to the United States through a valid port-of-
entry. 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016). 
55. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the term “aggravated felony” only 
referred to murder, federal drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking of certain 
firearms and destructive devices. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-690, 102 Stat. 4469–70 (1988). Under the INA, however, Congress 
expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” to include over thirty types 
of offenses, including battery, theft, and filing a false tax return. 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(43)(A)–(U) (2012). This, therefore, increased the number of noncitizens 
subjected to mandatory detention. See Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, 
Am. Immigr. Council (Mar. 16, 2012), http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-
facts/aggravated-felonies-overview [https://perma.cc/3WHD-UQPR] (ex-
plaining the possible immigration consequences of an “aggravated felony” 
conviction). 
56. See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Sta-
tutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
143, 145 (2015) (arguing that mandatory detention policies cast a wide net 
that incarcerates noncitizens who are not violent and pose no threat to 
national peace or security). 
57. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). 
58. H.R. Res. 2892, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted). 
59. See Sofya Aptekar, The Road to Citizenship: What 
Naturalization Means for Immigrants and the United States 26 
(2015) (considering the economic impact of the detention bed mandate). 
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Act of 2017, requires ICE to “maintain a level of not less than 34,040 
detention beds.”60 To justify this standard, the Act emphasizes that 
“[m]aintaining an adequate number of detention beds is critical to 
ensuring the integrity of our entire immigration enforcement system, 
including border enforcement.”61 And because the Appropriations Act 
does not define what it means to “maintain” a bed, some legislative 
officials argue that ICE must not only have 34,040 beds available, but 
the agency must actually fill those beds.62 One editorial board put it 
as follows: “Imagine if Congress mandated that an arbitrary number 
of jail cells be filled with prisoners—regardless of the crime rate. 
Authorities would be required to incarcerate people, no matter the 
circumstances or the affront to human rights. That’s basically the 
state of immigration detention in the U.S.”63 
If the concept of an incarceration quota seems unusual, it is. ICE 
is the only law enforcement agency that Congress subjects to these 
standards.64 Supporters of the bed mandate argue that it is necessary 
in order to “compel the agency to enforce existing immigration law,”65 
while opponents tag the policy as a paradigmatic example of the 
“denial of justice” imposed on noncitizens.66 But while politicians and 
 
60. H.R. Res. 5634, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). See also Immigration Deten-
tion Bed Quota Timeline, Nat’l Immigr. Justice Ctr. (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/immigration-detention-bed-quota-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/YE5D-RA6J] (tracking the legislative developments that 
created and maintained the detention bed quota). 
61. S. Rep. No. 114-264, at 55 (2016). 
62. Under the Obama administration, the Department of Homeland Security 
has interpreted the bed mandate to require ICE to maintain—but not fill—
the specified number of beds. Department of Homeland Security Oversight, 
C-SPAN, at 1:57:58 (May 29, 2014), http://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?319614-1/homeland-security-department-oversight-hearing [https://perma 
.cc/H8DP-TFP8] (providing testimony from Secretary Johnson to the House 
Judiciary Committee on his interpretation of the bed mandate). 
63. Editorial, The Madness of U.S. Immigration Policy, Continued, 
BloombergView (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/ 
articles/2013-09-26/the-madness-of-u-s-immigration-policy-continued [https: 
//perma.cc/ZQS3-CJWT]. 
64. See Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds 
Full, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-
beds-full [https://perma.cc/22ZQ-STFQ] (describing the bed mandate as 
part of a “massive increase in enforcement” of immigration laws). 
65. Id. 
66. Irving E. Figueroa, The Bed Quota: Mandatory Detention and the Denial 
of Justice, Univ. of N.C. Conf. on Race, Class, Gender & Ethnicity: 
Blog (Jan. 31, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://blogs.law.unc.edu/crcge/2014/01/31/ 
the-bed-quota-mandatory-detention-and-the-denial-of-justice [https://perma 
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advocates debate the effectiveness of the bed mandate, the burden on 
the American taxpayer remains. Even with the Obama 
Administration’s efforts to reduce the bed mandate to 30,913, the 
yearly 2017 budget for detention beds and related transportation 
reaches $1,748,000,000 (29,953 adult beds at a daily cost of $126.46 
per bed and 960 family beds at $161.36, plus related transportation 
expenses).67 
Seeking to fill these beds, Congress pressures ICE to detain many 
nonviolent offenders who may have criminal histories, but pose no 
public threat—the logic being that if Congress agrees to pay for the 
detention space, the agency needs to use it.68 This is especially 
disturbing in light of the fact that grounds for removability have no 
statute of limitations; noncitizens face removal on the basis of their 
misconduct, regardless of how long ago it occurred.69 As such, 
noncitizens with criminal convictions are particularly vulnerable.70 To 
meet the bed mandate, DHS initiates removal proceedings against 
noncitizens with criminal convictions long after they complete their 
 
.cc/Q8TJ-LUE4] (challenging the effectiveness of the bed mandate as a 
tool for immigration enforcement). 
67. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Budget in Brief 38 (2017), https://www 
.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017_BIB-MASTER.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/TBK5-JFGG]. For an interesting discussion of the monetary 
costs and individual harms associated with lengthy pre-trial detention in 
the criminal context, see Seth Osnowitz, Note, Demanding A Speedy Trial: 
Re-Evaluating the Assertion Factor in the Barker v. Wingo Test, 67 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 273, 283–84 (2017). 
68. See Christina Elhaddad, Comment, Bed Time for the Bed Mandate: A Call 
for Administrative Immigration Reform, 67 Admin. L. Rev. Accord 32, 43 
(2014) (“By placing ICE officers under the pressure of a quota system, 
Congress is compelling ICE supervisors to force ICE agents to ‘bring more 
bodies’ to detention facilities in order to abide by quotas without assessing 
whether the noncitizen is subject to detention.”). 
69. Generally, under non-criminal federal law, an action may not be brought 
against an individual for the enforcement of a civil penalty after five years 
from the date that a crime occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). Similarly, 
under federal criminal law, an individual may generally not be prosecuted 
for a non-capital offense, unless charges are brought within five years of the 
crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2012). Courts, however, have refused to apply 
similar time constraints on immigration charges. See, e.g., Restrepo v. 
Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787, 801 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Despite our dis-
comfiture with the prolonged delay in initiation of removal proceedings, we 
are compelled to concur in the conclusions of the BIA [that a statute of 
limitations does not apply] . . . . [T]he task of creating a limitations period 
lies with the legislature, not the judiciary.”). 
70. See Bedtime Stories, Det. Watch Network, http://endthequota.org/ 
bedtimestories/ [https://perma.cc/6MEB-P7BP] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) 
(documenting the stories of immigrants in detention on account of the bed 
mandate). 
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sentences—no matter how long ago or how long the noncitizen spent 
in prison.71 Take, for instance, Manuel Roman, father of two U.S. 
citizen children, a five-year-old and a one-month-old, who was 
arrested, detained, and placed in removal proceedings on the basis of 
a ten-year-old misdemeanor for simple drug possession.72 Although 
Manuel lived in the United States since childhood and may have been 
eligible for relief from removal under administrative reforms proposed 
by the Obama Administration,73 he was separated from his family and 
removed from the United States.74 Although many immigrants, like 
Manuel, have rehabilitated from their criminal pasts—attended 
counseling, enrolled in school, paid taxes, grown involved in their local 
communities, and taken steps to gain legal status—they nonetheless 
suffer from a looming threat of detention and, ultimately, removal.75 
B. The Privatization of Immigrant Detention Centers and the 
Boom of the For-Profit Prison Industry 
While the American taxpayer may squeal at the growing cost of 
immigrant detention—especially considering the availability of less ex-
pensive and more effective alternatives to detention—the private 
prison industry rejoices. The growing reliance on immigrant detention 
requires an increasing number of noncitizens to go through 
 
71. See Immigr. Legal Res. Ctr., Limit Removal Based on Long Ago 
Conduct, http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ijn-statute-of-limitations-
factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/74FK-YUJC] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) 
(hereinafter Limit) (“[I]mmigrants face deportation for conduct that 
happened many years ago because federal immigration authorities have 
deemed that the lack of a ‘statute of limitations’ in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act itself allows them to reach back in time as far as they want 
to deport people.”). 
72. Father of Two to be Deported This Friday for 10-Year Old Misdemeanor, 
Not One More Deportation, http://www.notonemoredeportation.com/ 
portfolio/manuelroman/ [https://perma.cc/H8DL-T7GJ] (last visited Mar. 
15, 2016). 
73. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), U.S. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/daca [https://perma.cc/ 
7PF4-PXEP] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (describing how the Obama Ad-
ministration’s proposed administrative reforms to the U.S. immigration 
system would impact people detained in immigrant detention facilities). See 
also Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred 
Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183, 
1185–94 (2015) (discussing ongoing challenges to the constitutionality of 
DACA and DAPA). 
74. Not One More Deportation, supra note 72. 
75. See Limit, supra note 71 (arguing that “holding immigrants under the 
threat of deportation for decades-old offenses violates basic notions of 
fairness long recognized in the law”). 
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immigration proceedings.76 In other words, the government is legally 
required to pay detention contractors to hold immigrant detainees, 
functionally guaranteeing multi-million-dollar profits to private prison 
operators. 
1. The Main Players:  
GEO Group and the Corrections Corporation of America 
Corrections Corporation of America77 opened the first private pri-
son in the United States—an immigrant detention center in Houston, 
Texas—in 1984.78 To meet immigrant detention quotas, the govern-
ment partners with private prisons to operate a joint network of over 
200 immigration jails across the country.79 In 2014, ICE held sixty-
two percent of its detainees in private facilities.80 Two companies 
dominate the private detention center market: the GEO Group 
(GEO) and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).81 Together, 
GEO and CCA operate eight of the ten largest immigrant detention 
centers, constituting seventy-two percent of detained immigrants.82 
And with Congress’s increased reliance on the detention bed mandate, 
 
76. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Unconstitutional Use of Restraints in 
Removal Proceedings, 67 Baylor L. Rev. 214, 218–19 (2015) (explaining 
the judicial process for noncitizens facing removal from the United States). 
77.  On October 28, 2016, Corrections Corporation of America changed its name 
to CoreCivic as part of a strategic decision to “transform [its] business.” 
Bethany Davis, Corrections Corporation of America Rebrands as CoreCivic, 
CoreCivic (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/ 
corrections-corporation-of-America-rebrands-as-corecivic [https://perma.cc/ 
FXR8-MV9L]. This corporate rebranding occurred in the immediate after-
math of increased public scrutiny of for-profit detention centers nationwide. 
See infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. Because existing literature and 
commentary on for-profit detention centers refer to CoreCivic by its former 
name, this paper will also refer to CoreCivic as Corrections Corporation of 
America or CCA. 
78. Silky Shah, Mary Small & Carol Wu, Banking on Detention: 
Local Lockup Quotas & the Immigrant Dragnet 3 (2015), http:// 
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20CCR
%20Banking%20on%20Detention%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV93-
J345].  
79. Id. at 1. 
80. See Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress En-
sures Private Prison Profits with an Immigrant Detention Quota 
6 (2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-
ensures-private-prison-profit-immigrant-detention-quota [https://perma.cc/ 
R7RH-7TDC] (describing how “the percent of the detained population held 
in private facilities has increased” as a result of the bed mandate). 
81. Id. at 8. 
82. Id. at 4. 
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CCA and GEO profits continue to rise. In 2007, CCA had a yearly 
profit of $133,373,000, while in 2014, it reported a profit of 
$195,022,000.83 GEO realized even more substantial gains, increasing 
from a 2007 profit of $41,845,000 to $143,840,000 in 2014.84 
In 2016, however, GEO and CCA’s profits reached an unexpected 
roadblock when the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it 
would gradually reduce—and, ultimately, end—its use of private pri-
sons.85 In a DOJ memo tilted “Reducing our Use of Private Prisons,” 
Sally Yates, then the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, explained that 
the DOJ would either terminate or fail to renew contracts with 
private prison companies, including GEO and CCA.86 The basis for 
this decision, according to the DOJ, was that private prisons 
“compare poorly” to Bureau of Prison facilities.87 As the DOJ memo 
explains: “[Private prisons] simply do not provide the same level of 
correctional services, programs, and resources; they do not save 
substantially on costs; and . . . they do not maintain the same level of 
safety and security.”88 While the initial announcement sent GEO and 
CCA stocks into a nosedive, the plummeting stock prices gradually 
recovered once shareholders learned that DOJ contracts comprised 
only a small amount of government contracts.89 Instead, DHS 
contracts for immigrant detention centers comprise most of GEO and 
CCA’s government expenditures.90 
Nevertheless, eight days after the DOJ announcement, DHS Sec-
retary Jeh Johnson instructed DHS to “evaluate whether the immi-
gration detention operations conducted by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement should move in the same direction [as DOJ].”91 In other  
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85.  Sally Q. Yates, Phasing Out Our Use of Private Prisons, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/phasing-out-
our-use-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/V2H2-J4E3]. 
86.  Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to the Acting Dir. 
of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/file/886311/download [https://perma.cc/X3BS-ZKKY]. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Hui-Yong Yu & Chris Strohm, Private Prison Stocks Sink After U.S. 
Signals the End, Bloomberg (Aug. 18, 2016, 5:22 PM), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-18/prison-reits-sink-on-report-u-s-to-
end-private-facility-use [https://perma.cc/C9Y7-JQS8]. 
90.  Id. 
91. Press Release, DHS Press Office, Statement by Sec’y Jeh C. Johnson on 
Establishing a Review of Privatized Immigration Det. (Aug. 29, 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/08/29/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-
establishing-review-privatized-immigration [https://perma.cc/HL73-NTRH]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
The Voluntary Work Program 
1303 
words, Secretary Johnson called for a review of for-profit immigrant 
detention centers to determine whether the Department should dis-
continue contracts with private prison operators. After a two-month 
investigation, a DHS report concluded that “fiscal considerations, 
combined with the need for realistic capacity to handle sudden 
increases in detention, indicate that DHS’s use of private for-profit 
detention will continue.”92 Despite this conclusion, a nonpartisan DHS 
advisory council voted to reject the key section of the report that said 
that DHS, logistically, was forced to rely on privately run detention 
centers.93 While the advisory council elected to uphold portions of the 
report calling for increased oversight over immigrant detention, the 
majority voted to support a dissent that rejected the finding that 
“reliance on private prisons should, or inevitably must, continue.”94 
But both the DHS report and advisory council’s vote are nonbind-
ing, and the Secretary of Homeland Security makes all final 
decisions.95 And within the first months of Donald Trump’s 
presidency, the Trump Administration scrapped all Obama-era 
proposals to phase out the use of private prisons.96 This was an 
unsurprising decision, given Trump’s vocal support for the private 
prison industry during the presidential campaign, where he stated 
that prison policy would involve “a lot of privatizations and private 
prisons,” which, according to Trump, “work a lot better [than 
government-operated incarceration facilities].”97 Ultimately, despite 
expert findings that private prisons are inefficient and unsafe, the era 
of private prisons will likely continue for the foreseeable future. 
2. The For-Profit Prison Industry as a Special Interest Group 
Given the financial benefit that for-profit prisons stand to gain 
from mandatory detention provisions, it is of little surprise that the 
 
92.  Alan Neuhauser, Homeland Security Panel Rejects Reliance on Private 
Prisons to House Immigrants, U.S. News & World Rep. (Dec. 1, 
2016, 7:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2016-12-01/homeland-security-splits-with-justice-
department-on-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/599L-MFVZ]. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
96. Laura Jarrett, DOJ Walks Back Guidance Discouraging Use of Private 
Prisons, CNN (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/politics/ 
doj-walks-back-guidance-discouraging-use-of-private-prisons/index.html?iid 
=EL [https://perma.cc/3ZCY-W9PL]. 
97. Full Transcript: MSNBC Town Hall with Donald Trump Moderated By 
Chris Matthews, MSNBC (Mar. 30, 2016), http://info.msnbc.com/_news/ 
2016/03/30/35330907-full-transcript-msnbc-town-hall-with-donald-trump-
moderated-by-chris-matthews?lite [https://perma.cc/F3Q6-MHKV]. 
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industry invests substantial funds into lobbying efforts and political 
campaigns. After all, with increased political capital, CCA and GEO 
can promote detention quotas that benefit their shareholders at the 
expense of immigrant men, women, and children. 
According to GEO, its lobbying campaigns focus on “government 
actions (legislative, regulatory and executive) that impact the constru-
ction and operation of prisons and detention facilities under public-
private partnerships.”98 This includes lobbying for “expanding the use 
of public-private partnerships generally and the use of alternatives to 
incarceration and detention.”99 In 2014, GEO spent a total of approxi-
mately $2,500,000 on direct lobbying, $300,000 at the Federal level, 
and $2,200,000 at the state and local levels.100 CCA reports similar 
figures with $2,600,000 on federal, state, and local lobbying efforts.101 
Although both companies claim that they do not lobby for or 
against legislation that would undermine the justice system or alter 
the duration of detention,102 their deep involvement in political contri-
butions suggests otherwise. Both CCA and GEO operate political 
action committees that use employee and shareholder contributions to 
make state and federal political campaign contributions.103 According 
to GEO disclosures, it gave approximately $1,700,000 to political can-
didates and political parties in 2014.104 CCA, on the other hand, made 
a little over $1.1 million in campaign contributions in twenty-eight 
states that same year.105 More recently, GEO contributed $125,000 to 
the Trump campaign on November 1, 2016.106 These political contri-
butions paid off: the day after Trump’s victory, private prison 
 
98. See GEO Grp., Political Activity and Lobbying Report 1 (2014), 
http://www.geogroup.com/documents/Political_Activity_Report_2014.p
df [https://perma.cc/QWB4-PHXT] (presenting GEO’s 2014 lobbying 
activities and political contributions). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 4. 
101. See Corrections Corp. of Am., Political Activity and Lobbying 
Report 6 (2014), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFy 
ZW50SUQ9MzA0Njc5fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1&cb=635779
353796645825 [https://perma.cc/H6HL-A34V] (describing CCA’s 2014 po-
litical and lobbying activities, including campaign contributions). 
102. Id. at 1; GEO Grp., supra note 98, at 1. 
103. See GEO Grp., supra note 98, at 2 (explaining GEO’s use of a federal 
political action committee to make contributions to federal elections). 
104. Id. at 4. 
105. Corrections Corp. of Am., supra note 101, at 3. 
106. Itemized Receipts of Rebuilding American Now, Fed. Election Comm’n 
(Jan. 13, 2017, 2:19 PM), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/forms/C00618876/ 
1132787/sa/ALL [https://perma.cc/F3TR-2Z9M]. 
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company stock soared, with CCA stock jumping nearly forty percent 
and GEO stock rising around twenty percent.107 Given Donald 
Trump’s support for private prisons, compared to Hillary Clinton’s 
calls to “[end] the privatization of prisons,”108 GEO and CCA held a 
direct stake in the outcome of the presidential race.109 Using their 
financial leverage, private prison companies support policies—
including the bed mandate and mandatory detention—that 
commodify immigrants and increase detention rates.110 
III. Immigration at the Intersection of Labor Law 
Although immigration laws prohibit employers from hiring undoc-
umented immigrants,111 approximately five percent of the U.S. work-
force consists of unauthorized immigrant workers.112 It is no secret, 
therefore, that undocumented workers are major contributors to the 
American workforce.113 This reality raises questions concerning the 
scope of employment rights afforded to unauthorized workers. The Su-
preme Court addressed this issue in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. 
v. National Labor Relations Board,114 where an employer fired a group  
107.  Bob Bryan, Private Prison Stocks Are Soaring After Donald Trump’s 
Election, Bus. Insider (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:55 AM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/private-prison-stocks-are-soaring-after-donald-trumps-election-2016-11 
[https://perma.cc/KSA4-TCR9]. 
108. Criminal Justice Reform, Hillary for Am., 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/ 
issues/criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/MW4W-PZKY] (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2017). 
109.  Id. 
110. Corrections Corp. of Am., supra note 101, at 3–4. 
111. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012) (prohibiting “employment of unauthorized 
aliens”). 
112. See Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal 
Immigration in the United States, Pew Res. Ctr. (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-
immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/5TQC-HA6F] (presenting data 
concerning employment rates of unauthorized immigrant workers in the 
United States). 
113. There are approximately 1.2 million undocumented workers in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, 1.3 million undocumented workers in the U.S. service 
sector, and millions of other undocumented workers employed in a variety of 
low-wage, high-risk occupations. See Rebecca Smith et al., Nat’l Emp’t 
Law Project, Undocumented Workers: Preserving Rights and 
Remedies After Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, http://www 
.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/wlghoff040303.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
F9KJ-23TG] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (explaining how Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds impacted undocumented workers’ rights). 
114. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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of employees for supporting a union-organizing campaign.115 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the employer’s re-
taliatory discharge of employees based on union activity violated the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered the employer to 
provide back pay and other relief to the discharged employees.116 The 
Supreme Court, however, held that undocumented workers—unlike 
lawfully employed workers—could not receive back pay under the 
NLRA.117 The Court’s decision raised concerns that denying back pay 
to undocumented workers failed to adequately deter employers from 
taking illegal employment actions against undocumented employees.118 
In response to Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the Department of Labor 
(DOL) defined its agency position on labor law as applied to undocu-
mented immigrants.119 Specifically, the DOL decided to enforce the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA), the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection 
Act (MSPA), and the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA) without 
regard to an employee’s immigration status.120 
This Part examines the legal protections afforded to non-detained 
immigrant workers. It sets the framework for the following Part, 
which asks why government protections are so stringent in the 
traditional American workplace, but not applied to the Voluntary 
Work Program in immigrant detention facilities. 
A. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), commonly known 
as the “Wage and Hour Law,”121 provides substantive guarantees for 
individual “employees” who work for “employers,” including minimum 
 
115. Id. at 140. 
116. Id. at 140–41. 
117. Id. at 140. 
118. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring employers to 
provide remedies for unlawful employment actions against undocumented 
workers “reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws 
and immigration laws seek to prevent”). 
119. Some employers read Hoffman Plastic Compounds to suggest that undocu-
mented workers have no protections under U.S. labor laws, leading the 
Department of Labor to issue its position on the matter. See Smith et al., 
supra note 113, at 1 (describing the changes to employment law following 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds). 
120. Id. at 11. 
121. Susan Charnesky, Comment, Protection for Undocumented Workers Under 
the FLSA: An Evaluation in Light of IRCA, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 379, 
382 (1988) (presenting the limited application of the FLSA to undocumented 
workers before Hoffman Plastic Compounds). 
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wage and overtime provisions.122 Specifically, the FLSA requires em-
ployers to pay employees no less than the federal minimum wage and 
one and a half times their normal salary for overtime hours.123 When 
President Roosevelt signed the FLSA into law, eleven-million workers 
gained greater workplace protections, balancing the unequal 
bargaining power that existed—and continues to exist—between 
employers and employees in the American workplace.124 
The FLSA requires employers to provide minimum wages “to each 
of his employees who . . . is engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce.”125 The question, however, of who qualifies as 
an “employee” remains largely unsettled.126 The FLSA defines an “em-
ployee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”127 An employer, 
in turn, is “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
an employer in relation to an employee.”128 Given the circular 
definition of “employer” and “employee,” and without further 
guidance from legislative history, courts have used the power of the 
bench to define the scope of coverage under the FLSA.129 Notably, 
courts consistently construe the FLSA to apply the act to “the 
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.”130 This 
 
122. See generally William B. Gould IV, A Primer on American Labor 
Law (5th ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (offering a foundational under-
standing of U.S. labor law, including the application and interpretation of 
the FLSA). 
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206, 207(a)(1) (2012). 
124. See Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 19, 140–41 (2000) (detailing the 
impact of the FLSA on the American family). 
125. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 
126. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) 
(recognizing the difficulty of determining the meaning of “employee” and 
calling statutory definitions of the term as “completely circular and ex-
plain[ing] nothing”). The FLSA and its amendments exempt specific types 
of workers from protection under the FLSA, including agricultural em-
ployees, disabled workers, tipped employees, outside salesmen, and 
amusement and recreational employees. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)–(4) (2012). 
127. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012). 
128. Id. § 203(d). 
129. See Harris, supra note 124, at 142–43 (showing the difficulty interpreting 
terms within the FLSA). 
130. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (finding 
employees who are “engaged in commerce” to be protected under the FLSA); 
see also Haro v. City of L.A., 745 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The 
FLSA is to be construed liberally in favor of employees; exemptions are 
narrowly construed against employers.”). 
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liberal construction recognizes that a broad interpretation of the 
FLSA is essential to maintaining decent working conditions.131 
Despite the many uncertainties surrounding the scope of the 
FLSA, the Department of Labor strongly emphasizes that the Wage 
and Hour Division enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act without 
regard to a worker’s immigration status.132 And in recent years, courts 
have upheld undocumented worker protections under the FLSA,133 
while the Supreme Court has declined to hear challenges that argue 
otherwise.134 As such, the FLSA protects non-detained immigrant 
workers—with or without work authorization—from wage and hour 
violations at the hands of unscrupulous employers. 
B. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was 
one of the most sweeping legislative overhauls of the U.S. immigration 
system.135 Also known as the “three-legged stool,” IRCA introduced a 
trio of regulations related to tougher border enforcement, a pathway 
to citizenship for select noncitizens, and harsh penalties for employers 
who employ undocumented workers.136 With an inflow of migrants 
 
131. E.g., Benshoff v. City of Va. Beach, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing that the FLSA must be “broadly interpreted and applied to 
effectuate its [remedial and humanitarian] goals”). 
132. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #48: 
Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of 
Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and 
Hour Division 1 (2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ 
whdfs48.pdf [https://perma.cc/U26V-7LHN] (describing the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Wage and Hour Division’s application of labor laws, including 
the FLSA, to unauthorized immigrant workers). 
133. See, e.g., Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 937 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that undocumented workers were eligible for protection under the 
FLSA). 
134. See, e.g., Jerusalem Cafe, LLC v. Lucas, 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (mem.) 
(denying to hear an employer’s appeal that challenged the application of the 
FLSA on unauthorized immigrant workers). 
135. See generally María E. Enchautegui, Urban Inst., A Comparison of 
Today’s Unauthorized Immigrants and the IRCA Legalized: 
Implications for Immigration Reform (2013), http://www.urban.org/ 
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412980-A-Comparison-of-Today-
s-Unauthorized-Immigrants-and-the-IRCA-Legalized-Implications-for-
Immigration-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLW9-BJMQ] (comparing the 
economic status of noncitizens at the time IRCA was passed with the 
economic conditions of noncitizens seeking legalization today). 
136. See generally Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner & Claire Bergeron, At Its 
25th Anniversary, IRCA’s Legacy Lives On, Migration Policy Inst. 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-25th-
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crossing the southern border to find work in the United States, 
Congress enacted IRCA to control undocumented immigration.137 In 
doing so, IRCA imposed widespread changes to employment 
practices—both on the employee and the employer.138 
Under IRCA, employers are prohibited from hiring anyone 
without lawful work authorization, thereby restricting employment to 
U.S. citizens and noncitizens with employment authorization.139 This 
“workplace-based immigration-enforcement scheme” established pun-
ishments for employers and employees who fail to follow employment 
laws.140 Employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers are 
subject to fines of up to $3,000 per unlawful worker and imprisonment 
of up to six months.141 Similarly, employees who produce fraudulent 
documentation to gain employment may be subject to a fine and im-
prisonment of up to fifteen years.142 
Although many people read the government oversight and 
criminal penalties imposed under IRCA as indication of congressional 
intent to prevent noncitizens from gaining employment in the U.S. 
labor market, another reading of the statutory language suggests that 
the bill is designed to protect undocumented workers from 
discrimination, abuse, and exploitation.143 In fact, IRCA’s relevance to 
contemporary employment law is based largely on the 
antidiscrimination protections that it offers undocumented workers. 
These protections are designed to “deter the employment of 
unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers 
to exploit and use such aliens.”144 Furthermore, IRCA’s pathway to  
anniversary-ircas-legacy-lives [https://perma.cc/Y889-BPDJ] (recounting 
the history, evolution, and adoption of IRCA). 
137. Id. 
138. See Compliance Assistance—Immigration Reform and Control Act, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/ca_irca.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L7GK-4GC5] (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (providing a 
synopsis of compliance requirements for employers under IRCA). 
139. Id. 
140. Kati L. Griffith, ICE Was Not Meant to Be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights 
Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 
1137, 1138 (2011) (describing the challenges that ICE faces in its attempts 
to enforce IRCA and other workplace regulations). 
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2012). 
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(2) (2012). 
143. See Kati L. Griffith, When Federal Immigration Exclusion Meets Subfederal 
Workplace Inclusion: A Forensic Approach to Legislative History, 17 N.Y.U. 
J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 881, 887–88 (2014) (assessing the congressional 
purpose underlying IRCA). 
144. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359, 3381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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citizenship provisions “meant higher wages, improvement of workforce 
skills, and a level playing field for other workers.”145 It is clear, 
therefore, that Congress intended IRCA to provide workplace 
protections for unauthorized workers. 
IV. Redefining the Classification of  
Immigrant Detention 
If contemporary labor law—including the FLSA—protects non-
detained immigrant workers in the traditional American workforce, 
then why do the same laws not apply to detained immigrant workers 
in the Voluntary Work Program? Until now, courts denied FLSA pro-
tections to detained immigrant workers on the basis that immigrants 
are comparable to prisoners—a class of people generally regarded as 
outside the scope of the FLSA.146 This Note challenges the 
“immigrants-as-prisoners” analogy that courts rely on to deny FLSA 
protections to detained immigrant workers. Although there are 
similarities between prisoners and immigrant detainees, there are 
fundmental differences that suggest that immigrant detainees are 
eligible for greater labor rights than prisoners. As such, courts should 
reform their analysis of FLSA protections for detained immigrant 
workers and apply the “economic realities” test to extend the FLSA—
includeing minimum wage requirements—to the Voluntary Work 
Program. 
A. Rejecting the “Immigrants-as-Prisoners” Framework 
Despite lawsuits from detained immigrant workers, alleging 
instances of forced labor and involuntary servitude under the 
Voluntary Work Program,147 there are virtually no challenges to the 
 
145. Sherrie A. Kossoudji, Am. Immigr. Council, Back to the Future: 
The Impact of Legalization Then and Now 4 (2013), http://www. 
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/back_to_the_future.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZN2M-KG9S] (describing how legalization for select 
groups of undocumented immigrants strengthened workplace enforcement 
laws against unauthorized workers). 
146. See Alvarado Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining 
to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act to detained immigrant workers 
“[b]ecause of the similarities in circumstances between the prison inmates and 
Plaintiff detainees”). Some courts, however, recognize FLSA protections for 
inmates who are assigned to work at private companies outside of the jail-
house and, therefore, are more closely tied to the American workforce. See, 
e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1555–56 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting in-
mates who voluntarily worked at a private construction company “employee” 
status and FLSA protections). 
147. See Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 218–19 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting an 
immigrant detainee’s argument that the maintenance tasks he provided 
under threat of solitary confinement constituted “involuntary servitude,” 
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program as a whole.148 Where challenges to the Voluntary Work 
Program do exist, courts rely nearly exclusively on Alvarado Guevara 
v. INS,149 a 1990 case in which alien detainees at Port Isabel 
Detention Center in Los Frenos, Texas, sued the government for 
FLSA violations.150 In reaching its holding that detained immigrant 
workers are not “employees” eligible for protections under the FLSA, 
the court relied on an analogy that likened detained immigrant 
workers to prison laborers.151 This analogy, however, is severely 
misguided. In comparing detained immigrants to prisoners, courts fail 
to adequately consider the differences between detained immigrants 
and incarcerated prisoners, which, ultimately, undermine the 
“immigrants-as-prisoners” framework. 
1. The Flawed Comparison Between Prison Labor and the 
Voluntary Work Program 
The “immigrants-as-prisoners” model improperly likens immigrant 
detention with criminal incarceration. It is an often-overlooked fact 
that immigration violations are civil violations, not criminal 
offenses.152 Whereas prisoners are in jail as punishment for committing 
a crime, detained immigrants are only incarcerated to ensure 
compliance with immigration decisions.153 Unlike prisoners who receive 
sentences for a defined length, detained immigrants are generally held 
for an unspecified period of time that often lasts longer than six 
 
because the Thirteenth Amendment’s “civic duty” exemption permits the 
government to threaten criminal sanction to compel someone to perform 
“civic duties,” such as the plaintiff’s housekeeping chores). 
148. Although, historically, there have been very few challenges to the Voluntary 
Work Program, a class action lawsuit filed by detained immigrant workers 
against GEO remains ongoing in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado. Docket, Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 1:14-cv-02887 (D. Colo. 
Oct 22, 2014). 
149. 902 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1990). 
150. See id. at 395–96 (“[Prisoners] are similar to detainees in that they have been 
incarcerated and are under the direct supervision and control of a govern-
mental entity [and] should not be protected under the FLSA.”). 
151. Id.  
152. See Am. Immigration Council, Two Systems of Justice: How the 
Immigration System Falls Short of American Ideals of Justice 2 
(2013), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/ 
research/aic_twosystemsofjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R3W-VSS7] (argu-
ing that classifying immigration violations as a civil offense is an artificial 
distinction, and that the consequences resulting from deportation—such as 
family separation, for instance—makes it a more severe penalty than many 
administered in the criminal justice setting). 
153. See Sinha, supra note 32, at 8–12 (describing how Congress and the Su-
preme Court view the purpose of immigrant detention). 
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months.154 The law only supports immigrant detention “to the extent 
necessary to enforce compliance with immigration proceedings,”155 and 
the Supreme Court recognizes that removal proceedings “[are] not a 
punishment for a crime.”156 Instead, immigrant detention is a method 
of returning aliens to their home country for failing to comply with 
immigration laws.157 As such, prisoners and detained immigrants exist 
within two separate justice systems, and drawing a direct comparison 
between the two classes of people overlooks important factors that 
distinguish the civil immigration and criminal systems. 
Nevertheless, although immigration violations are not criminal 
offenses, heavy-handed enforcement policies and anti-immigrant 
politics have created an inaccurate perception that immigration 
violations are criminal in nature. So too, court rulings, such as 
Alvarado Guevara, which compare immigrants to criminals as the 
primary basis to deny labor protections, cultivate the misperception 
that immigrants should be viewed as criminals.158 
To determine the application of labor laws on the Voluntary 
Work Program, courts must recognize and reject this misperception 
and conduct independent legal reasoning that considers the unique 
situation of detained immigrants. In Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, 
Inc.,159 the Ninth Circuit denied FLSA protections to prison workers 
 
154. See Mark Noferi, Immigration Detention: Behind the Record Numbers, Ctr. 
for Migration Stud. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://cmsny.org/immigration-
detention-behind-the-record-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/J4CR-G9AH] (ex-
trapolating data from the Department of Homeland Security which projects 
that the average length of immigrant detention is approximately thirty days, 
but varies widely depending on the form of relief that the detainee seeks). 
155. Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to 
Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1485, 1488 (2012) (arguing that immigration detention serves to control 
crime, not just manage immigration enforcement). 
156. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (reasoning that 
deportation is merely “a method of enforcing [an alien’s] return to his own 
country,” and is not a deprivation “of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law” that would entitle an alien to the procedural protections of 
the criminal justice system). 
157. See Sinha, supra note 32, at 5 (distinguishing the purposes of immigrant 
detention from criminal incarceration). 
158. Notably, if immigration violations were categorized as criminal offenses, then 
they would be eligible for the procedural protections that are available in 
the criminal system, but not in the immigration context. These safeguards 
include Miranda warnings, appointed counsel, right to a bail hearing, right 
to a speedy trial, prohibition of illegally obtained evidence, and right to trial 
before jury—all fundamental elements of justice in the criminal justice 
system that are denied in the civil immigration setting. Am. Immigration 
Council, supra note 152, at 5–10. 
159. 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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on the grounds that “common sense and common intelligence” suggest 
that Congress did not intend the FLSA to protect felons serving time 
in prison.160 The court went on to explain: 
This is a category of persons—convicted murderers, rapists, bur-
glars, armed robbers, swindlers, thieves, and the like—whose 
civil rights are subject to suspension and whose work in prison 
could be accurately characterized in an economic sense as 
involuntary servitude, peonage, or indeed slavery—all of which 
are prohibited by law—were it not for the exceptions carved out 
by the courts from these prohibitions for persons “duly tried, 
convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for crime in accordance 
with law.”161 
While, as the court acknowledges, prisoners, such as those in 
Gilbreath, are “tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned,” 
immigrant detainees are not.162 Most detainees are awaiting 
immigration hearings and are trapped in prolonged detention because 
of backlogs in the immigration courts—not as a result of their 
personal conduct.163 In fact, approximately half of the people who 
appear before an immigration court are ultimately permitted to stay 
in the United States, either because they are lawfully present or as a 
result of judicial discretion.164 That is not to say, however, that all 
detained immigrants are free from criminal pasts.165 But immigrants 
who are convicted of crimes must generally serve their criminal 
sentences in prison before entering immigration proceedings.166  
160. Id. at 1324. 
161. Id. at 1325 (quoting Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963)). 
162. Id. 
163. See Sinha, supra note 32, at 4–5 (“Unlike prison sentences in the criminal 
context, immigration detention is inherently indeterminate, and due in part 
to the extensive backlogs in the immigration court system, the average time 
some noncitizens remain in detention has gotten longer.” (citation omitted)). 
164. See Urbina, supra note 1 (“Immigrants in holding centers may be in the co-
untry illegally, but they may also be asylum seekers, permanent residents or 
American citizens whose documentation is questioned by the authorities.”). 
165. See generally Walter A. Ewing, Daniel E. Martínez & Rubén G. 
Rumbaut, The Criminalization of Immigration in the United 
States (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/ 
files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_united_states
.pdf [https://perma.cc/28SN-36CQ] (examining the relationship between 
immigration patterns and crime rates). 
166. See Alex Nowrasteh, Immigration and Crime—What the Research Says, 
CATO Inst. (July 14, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/ 
immigration-crime-what-research-says [https://perma.cc/XU9C-2HZA] (com-
paring data to determine whether greater immigration leads to increased 
crime). 
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Detention centers, on the other hand, do not function as a form of 
punishment; they are merely waiting rooms for immigrants seeking to 
have their day in court.167 Detained immigrants, therefore, are not 
incarcerated based on trial, conviction, or criminal sentence, and the 
Court’s reasoning in Gilbreath for denying FLSA coverage to prisoners 
does not stand in the immigration context. 
Although still not perfectly analogous, the immigration context is 
more appropriately related to that of pretrial detention. In Villarreal 
v. Woodham,168 the Eleventh Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to 
hear a FLSA claim for pretrial detainees and to decide whether 
pretrial detainees are “employees” under the FLSA.169 As in Gilbreath, 
the court ultimately concluded that correctional facilities for pretrial 
detainees provide inmates with their everyday needs and refused to 
extend FLSA protections.170 Specifically, the court held that “[t]he 
relationship is not one of employment,” because prisoners are removed 
from the national economy and are not subject to competition in the 
free market.171 
But, like Gilbreath, Villarreal is distinguished from causes of 
action arising from the Voluntary Work Program. In Villarreal, the 
pretrial nonimmigrant detainee performed translation services for 
other inmates, court personnel, and medical staff.172 He performed 
 
167. The number of detained immigrants with criminal history fluctuates based 
on the government’s enforcement priorities. Between 1996 and 2006, “65 
percent of immigrants who were detained and deported” committed 
nonviolent crimes. Nat’l Immigr. Forum, The Math of Immigrant 
Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not 
Add Up to Sensible Policies 5 (2013), https://immigrationforum.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-Detention-August-2013-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MBM-7DFL] (confronting the economic 
inefficiencies of U.S. immigration policy). From 2009 to 2011, however, over 
half of detained immigrants had no criminal records, and twenty percent of 
those with criminal records were for traffic offenses. Id. In more recent 
years, as the Department of Homeland Security exercises prosecutorial 
discretion to prioritize immigration enforcement against people with 
criminal pasts, the percentage of detained immigrants with criminal 
histories has increased. FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/removal-
statistics/2015 [https://perma.cc/W278-4TL4] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) 
(summarizing ICE’s removal activities in 2015). 
168. 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir. 1997) 
169. See id. at 207 (“Whether a restriction or condition accompanying pretrial 
detention is punishment turns on whether the restriction or condition is 
reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.”). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 204. 
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these services relying on an unwritten proposition that the Sheriff’s 
Department would provide compensation.173 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that “[t]here was no ‘bargained-for’ exchange of labor which 
occurs in a true employer-employee relationship.”174 The Voluntary 
Work Program, however, consists of an agreement with set pricing, 
hiring criteria, and other requirements that more closely resemble a 
bargained-for exchange of labor.175 As such, although immigrant 
detainees are removed from society, they are part of an “apparent 
exchange of money for labor,”176 and, therefore, are lost in the 
crosshairs of Villarreal’s legal reasoning. 
Cases such as Villarreal, Gilbreath, and Alvarado Guevara rely on 
an unsubstantiated comparison between the immigration and criminal 
systems and should not have determinative authority over cases 
arising from the Voluntary Work Program. Detention—and the 
deportation process, generally—is different. “It is a unique legal 
animal that lives in the crease between the civil and criminal 
labels,”177 and attempts to categorize immigrant detention as 
exclusively civil or criminal will ultimately prove inadequate. 
2. Moving Past Alvarado Guevara as the Determinative Authority over 
Detained Immigrant Workers 
As explained above, courts have historically relied on the 
“immigrants-as-prisoners” model to deny detained immigrant workers 
with FLSA protections—including, among other benefits, minimum 
wage payments. Before examining other approaches to FLSA appli-
cation to detained immigrant workers, it is necessary to explain why 
courts should formally discard their reliance on Alvarado Guevara and 
open their eyes to see detained immigrant workers as distinct from 
prison laborers. While, at first blush, government-compelled 
incarceration may suggest a reliable comparison between the two 
classes, there are fundamental differences that suggest the court’s 
reasoning in Alvarado Guevara was misguided—or at least 
shortsighted. 
In Alvarado Guevara, detained immigrant workers at the Port 
Isabel Detention Center sued the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) (the former U.S. Agency responsible for administering 
 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 207. 
175. See PBNDS, supra note 2, at 382–87 (establishing the operational details 
of the Voluntary Work Program). 
176. Alvarado Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1990). 
177. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299, 
1299 (2011) (considering the Supreme Court’s evolving immigration jurispru-
dence to argue that deportation is not fully civil or criminal in nature). 
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immigration and naturalization issues) for violating the FLSA.178 
There, the detainees performed maintenance tasks in an immigrant 
detention facility, including cooking, laundry, and other services at a 
rate of $1.00 per day.179 Although the court recognized an “apparent 
exchange of money for labor,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s dismissal, because “[i]t would not be within the legislative 
purpose of the FLSA to protect those in Plaintiffs’ situation.”180 The 
legislative purpose, the court reasoned, “was to protect the ‘standard 
of living’ and ‘general well-being’ of the worker in American 
industry.”181 Because the government protects the “standard of living” 
for all immigrant detainees in the form of food, shelter, and 
clothing,182 subminimum wages do not threaten the detainees’ “general 
well-being.” Thus, the court held that detained immigrants, like 
prisoners, “are not within the group that Congress sought to protect 
in enacting the FLSA.”183 
The case law that formed the basis for the Alvarado Guevara de-
cision drew exclusively from a handful of cases, each of which 
considered the labor rights of prison inmates.184 While both parties in 
Alvarado Guevara “admit[ted] that there [were] no cases dealing 
directly with factually identical circumstances,” the court relied on 
legal precedent related to labor rights for prison workers and did not 
consider any other analogies that may more closely reflect the 
situation of a detained immigrant worker.185 
Further distinguishing Alvarado Guevara from causes of action 
under the Voluntary Work Program is the fact that the supporting 
case law in Alvarado Guevara concerns work for independent profit-
making private entities—not the incarceration center itself.186 Because 
 
178. Alvarado Guevara, 902 F.2d at 395. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 396. 
181. Id. 
182. Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1991). 
183. Alvarado Guevara, 902 F.2d at 396. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149, 149–50 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(denying FLSA protection to prison laborers working for a blood plasma 
program); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 453 F.2d 1259, 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(denying FLSA protection for prison workers in drug clinics on prison 
grounds); Worsley v. Lash, 421 F. Supp. 556, 556 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (finding 
that a prison worker at an off-site hospital was not an “employee” within the 
FLSA); Lavigne v. Sara, Inc., 424 So. 2d 273, 273–74 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(denying FLSA protection to prison workers at a scientific research com-
pany). 
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the Voluntary Work Program provides in-house labor for detention 
centers, it should be subject to a distinct legal analysis. The analytical 
reasoning in Alvarado Guevara, therefore, is flawed, and courts should 
discontinue their reliance on it in challenges to the Voluntary Work 
Program. 
B. Alternative Classifications 
In light of the incompatibilities between immigrant detainees and 
prisoners, courts should turn elsewhere to find case law that more 
closely resembles the situation of the detained immigrant worker. 
Because the purpose of the FLSA is to protect the “standard of 
living” and “general well-being” of workers in the American 
workforce, courts often hold that incarcerated workers are not entitled 
to minimum wage protections because their employer provides their 
everyday needs—including food, clothing, and shelter.187 Still, there 
are select classes of workers who retain their basic living needs from 
their employer, but still receive minimum wage protections under the 
FLSA. This Section considers two of these protected classes: patient-
workers and live-in domestic service workers. Courts should apply the 
same reasoning that they use to protect patient-workers and live-in 
domestic service workers to provide FLSA protections to detained 
immigrants. 
1. Applying the Patient-Worker Analysis 
Rather than the debunked “immigrants-as-prisoners” analogy, 
courts could consider detained immigrant workers in the framework of 
working in privately-operated mental institutions. In Weidenfeller v. 
Kidulis,188 for instance, two men receiving treatment and custodial 
care at a privately owned and operated for-profit boarding house 
brought a lawsuit under the FLSA for unpaid wages.189 While in 
custody, the institution employed the plaintiffs to provide 
maintenance services, including mowing the lawn, cleaning rooms, and 
washing dishes.190 Plaintiffs alleged that this labor was entirely 
nontherapeutic and exclusively for the benefit of the institution.191 On 
the basis that “a right to compensation exists for residents of mental 
institutions under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” the court refused to 
dismiss the cause of action and denied summary judgment for the 
 
187. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012); see, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 
205–06 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing the legislative purpose behind the FLSA as 
grounds to deny minimum wage rights to detained immigrant workers). 
188. 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974).  
189. Id. at 447. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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defendant.192 Because detained immigrant labor benefits prison 
operators, detained workers should have the same “right to 
compensation” under the FLSA that the court identifies in 
Weidenfeller. 
Similarly, in Souder v. Brennan,193 three residents at a state hos-
pital for the mentally ill brought suit for minimum wage and overtime 
protection under the FLSA.194 The court upheld their right to FLSA 
protection on the basis that patient-workers are engaged in an “em-
ployee” and “employer” relationship.195 The court reached this conclu-
sion in spite of the fact that patient-workers are not included in the 
enumerated list of workers who are statutorily eligible for FLSA pro-
tections.196 Like patient-workers, detained immigrants are not 
explicitly exempted from or included in the FLSA.197 Furthermore, as 
in Weidenfeller, the court found that the employer was the sole 
beneficiary of the employee’s labor, concluding: 
So long as the institution derives any consequential economic 
benefit the economic reality test would indicate an employment 
relationship rather than mere therapeutic exercise. To hold 
otherwise would be to make therapy the sole justification for 
thousands of positions as dishwashers, kitchen helpers, 
messengers and the like.198 
Ultimately, the court rejected the defendant-employer’s motion for 
summary judgment and upheld FLSA protections for the proposed 
class: “patient-workers in non-Federal institutions for the residential 
care of the mentally ill.”199 
Recognizing wage and hour protections for patient-workers 
suggests that similar protections belong to detained immigrant 
workers who are employed in private detention facilities. To hold 
otherwise would be contrary to the court’s determination in 
Weidenfeller and Souter and provide unjust enrichment to employers 
such as GEO and CCA.200 
 
192. Id. at 449, 452. 
193. 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973). 
194. Id. at 811. 
195. Id. at 813–15. 
196. Id. at 812. 
197. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
198. Souder, 367 F. Supp. at 813. 
199. Id. at 814. 
200. In Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., detained immigrant workers brought a law-
suit against GEO for abuses under the Voluntary Work Program. Menocal 
v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1125 (D. Colo. 2015). Although 
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2. Applying the Live-in Domestic Service Worker Analysis 
Live-in domestic service workers “provide services of a household 
nature in or about a private home” and reside within such a house-
hold.201 These workers include cooks, housekeepers, handymen, gar-
deners, and maids.202 Although not originally identified as an indepen-
dent class of workers, the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act explicitly extended FLSA wage protections to domestic ser-
vice employees.203 Like detained immigrant workers, many live-in 
domestic service workers receive room and board from their employer. 
Because the FLSA defines “wage” to include the “reasonable cost . . . 
to the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or 
other facilities,”204 benefits such as food, shelter, and clothing are con-
sidered “wages in another form” and may be applied against an em-
ployee’s wage.205 For the live-in domestic service worker, this means 
that an employer may consider the reasonable cost of the employer-
provided everyday needs and subtract it from their actual income. 
But, even if the employer and employee agree to a form of alternative 
payment, the value of that payment must be no less than minimum 
wage. 
This scheme, however, is not without government regulation. In 
relation to employer setoffs, the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor stipulates that: 
 
the judge dismissed the detainees’ minimum wage claims, the court denied 
GEO’s motion to dismiss concerning claims related to unjust enrichment 
and violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Id. at 1135. 
201. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #79B: Live-
in Domestic Service Workers Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) 1 (2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs 
79b.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLE4-CWLT] (describing who constitutes a live-
in domestic service worker and the scope of their rights under the FLSA). 
202. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2016) (“The term domestic service employment means 
services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a pri-
vate home (permanent or temporary). The term includes services performed 
by employees such as companions, babysitters, cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, 
maids, housekeepers, nannies, nurses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handy-
men, gardeners, home health aides, personal care aides, and chauffeurs of 
automobiles for family use. This listing is illustrative and not exhaustive.”). 
203. 29 U.S.C. § 206(f) (2012). 
204. Id. § 203(m). 
205. Tony & Susan Alamo Found v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1985) 
(finding that when an employer provides someone food, shelter, clothing, 
transportation, or medical expenses in exchange for labor, the employer’s 
goods and services constitute a form of wage payments); see also Rutherford 
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (considering the applica-
tion of in-kind wages within the “economic realities” test). 
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The reasonable cost of board, lodging, or other facilities may be 
considered as part of the wage paid an employee only where 
customarily “furnished” to the employee. Not only must the em-
ployee receive the benefits of the facility for which he is charged, 
but it is essential that his acceptance of the facility be voluntary 
and uncoerced.206 
Put another way, an employer may not compensate an employee in 
the form of room and board, unless the employee voluntarily agrees to 
accept in-kind payment.207 Because, however, detained immigrants are 
required to live and eat in the detention center, it cannot be said that 
they are voluntarily agreeing to have their compensation appear in the 
form of food, shelter, and other everyday essentials. 
Although there is not a wealth of case law analyzing the 
“voluntary and uncoerced” provision of this DOL regulation,208 courts 
generally consider whether or not the employee has a genuine choice 
as to whether or not to accept the position.209 In Marshall v. 
Intraworld Commodities Corp.,210 the court found that an employer 
was not permitted to deduct the cost of meals, lodging, or other 
facilities from his live-in domestic worker, because “[t]he claimant had 
no other place to live and no choice but to accept the food and 
facilities provided to him.”211 The court concluded that if an employee 
has no other place to live and no choice but to accept non-monetary 
compensation, then an employer may not claim that the payment was 
voluntarily accepted without coercion.212 
The same “voluntary and uncoerced” standard that the DOL re-
cognizes for live-in domestic service workers should apply to detained 
 
206. 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (2012) (emphasis added). 
207. Some courts hold that acceptance of in-kind payment does not require an 
explicit agreement between parties. Rather, the nature of the work itself 
may be a sufficient basis to indicate that the employee voluntarily chose a 
position that provides an alternative form of compensation. See, e.g., Lopez 
v. Rodriguez, 668 F.2d 1376, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that a live-in 
housekeeper understood that she would be compensated, in part, by board 
and lodging when she accepted a job that required “live-in” responsibilities). 
208. The DOL regulations do not define the terms “voluntary” or “uncoerced,” 
leaving the courts to determine their meaning. 29 C.F.R. § 531.30. 
209. See, e.g., Lopez, 668 F.2d at 1380 (“[E]ven where an employee voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts a job which, by its nature, requires board and lodging 
in the employer’s home, an employer may impose ‘coercive’ conditions—that 
is, conditions so onerous and restrictive that the employee’s continued 
employment and acceptance of board and lodging ceases to be voluntary.”). 
210. No. 79 C 918, 1980 WL 2097 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1980). 
211. Id. at *4. 
212. Id. at *4–5. 
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immigrant workers as well. And in the context of the Voluntary Work 
Program, detained immigrant workers have no choice besides 
accepting the food and shelter that the detention facility provides. 
This means that, because the detained workers have no choice but to 
accept the detention facility’s food, clothing, and shelter, it is 
improper for courts to permit subminimum wage payments to 
detained immigrants on the basis that detention centers provide their 
basic needs. 
C. Revisiting the “Economic Realities” Test 
As a result of ambiguous statutory language in the FLSA, the 
terms “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” remain hotly litigated 
topics, with employers seeking to minimize their obligations to their 
workers and employees seeking to increase their rights.213 Unless 
immigrant detainees are classified as “employees,” then “[their] labor 
belongs to the penitentiary and it is not compensable.”214 As such, an 
analysis of FLSA protection over detained immigrant workers must 
prove that they fit within the statutory definition of “employee.” 
Without a precise line between protected and unprotected 
workers, courts look to one another for interpretative guidance. The 
Supreme Court, while not ruling on the application of the FLSA as it 
relates to detained immigrant workers, instructs a liberal application 
of the FLSA.215 As a general rule, however, courts recognize social 
welfare legislation, including the FLSA, as applying to employees 
“who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business 
to which they render service.”216 And to determine whether a 
 
213. See, e.g., David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: 
The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar Problem, 12 Rutgers J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
138, 138–42, 151–52 (2015) (explaining that employee classification is “often 
litigated,” because “many employers misclassify their workers in order to 
save on labor costs” and “illegally depriv[e] employees of employment 
protections”). 
214. See Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh 
Economic Reality of Working Inmates, 27 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 679, 700 
(2015) (arguing that the economic realities test is an “uneven fit” to measure 
a prisoner’s employment status under the FLSA). 
215. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–30 (1947) 
(holding that a broad reading of the FLSA is appropriate to recognize that 
workers are employees under the FLSA); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 
603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Courts have adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the definitions of ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ under the FLSA 
in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act.”). 
216. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 
2015-1 (2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI-2015 
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLC9-V5NQ] (affirming the longstanding proposi-
tion that whether a worker qualifies as an employee under the FLSA “focuses 
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qualifying employment relationship exists to trigger FLSA 
protections, courts must consider the economic realities of the 
employment relationship.217 
It is well recognized that the economic realities test is not 
measured by any one isolated factor; instead, it takes into account the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a protected 
relationship exists between the employer and the employee.218 
Notably, courts have uniformly rejected this approach as it pertains 
to prison workers.219 In Danneskjold v. Hausrath,220 for instance, the 
plaintiff, an inmate at Attica Correctional Facility, applied for a 
position as a clerk-tutor inside the facility, where he received 
compensation varying from $0.95 to $1.45 per day of work.221 He sued 
the correctional facility for back pay under the FLSA. In upholding 
summary judgment for the defendant, the court noted: 
Prisoners may . . . be ordered to cook, staff the library, perform 
janitorial services, work in the laundry, or carry our [sic] num-
erous other tasks that serve various institutional missions of the 
prison, such as recreation, care and maintenance of the facility, 
or rehabilitation. Such work occupies prisoners’ time that might 
otherwise be filled by mischief; it trains prisoners in the discip-
line and skills of work; and it is a method of seeing that priso-
ners bear a cost of their incarceration.222 
 
on whether the worker is economically dependent on the employer or in 
business for him or herself”). 
217. See, e.g., Safarian v. American DG Energy, Inc., 622 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“The fundamental point here is that courts must look to the 
economic realities, not the structure, of the relationship between the workers 
and the businesses [to define the employment relationship under the 
FLSA].”). 
218. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)); see also U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, supra note 216, at 4 (“In undertaking this analysis, each 
factor is examined and analyzed in relation to one another, and no single 
factor is determinative.”). 
219. Matthew J. Lang, Comment, The Search for a Workable Standard for When 
Fair Labor Standards Act Coverage Should Be Extended to Prison Workers, 
5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 191, 204 (2003) (“[A]lthough the Supreme 
Court or Congress has not grappled the issue, the circuits are in agreement 
that all inside prison work is not covered by the FLSA and thus inmate 
workers may be paid less than the minimum wage.”). 
220. 82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996). 
221. Id. at 39–40. 
222. Id. at 43. 
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Even voluntary labor should not be protected, the Danneskjold court 
specified, because it “serves all of the penal functions of forced 
labor.”223 But, as explained above, labor in the immigration context—
including the Voluntary Work Program—is not intended as a punitive 
measure.224 In fact, detention itself was not conceived as punishment, 
but, rather, as an operational requirement; its limited purpose is to 
ensure that noncitizens appear in immigration court and comply with 
removal orders.225 So too, immigration offenses—for which the 
detainees are held in detention—are civil violations, not criminal.226 
These differences, combined with the other distinguishing features 
between labor in prisons as opposed to detention facilities,227 provide 
sufficient reason to move past the Danneskjold court’s reasoning and 
for proceeding with the application of the economic realities test to 
detained immigrant workers. 
As such, if we move away from the “immigrants-as-prisoners” 
analogy, then an “economic realities” analysis for detained immigrant 
workers is the appropriate analytical model to determine “employee” 
status under the FLSA.228 Although there is no single determinative 
factor under the “economic realities” test, the analysis generally turns 
on the economic dependence of the worker on the employer.229 Some 
other criteria courts consider in the economic realities test are as 
follows: (1) the nature and degree of the employer’s control over the 
employee (2) the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss (3) the em-
ployee’s investment in equipment or materials (4) whether the service 
provided requires special skill (5) the duration of the relationship and 
 
223. Id. 
224. See supra Part IV.A.1 (distinguishing the characteristics of detained immi-
grant workers and prison laborers). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Although, today, the “economic realities” test remains the primary analytic 
framework to determine coverage under the FLSA, courts have historically 
used other tests to make this determination. Timothy J. Bartkiw, Regulatory 
Differentials and Triangular Employment Growth in the U.S. and Canada, 
19 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 1, 15–16 (2015) (describing the “statutory 
purposes,” “hybrid,” and “common law entrepreneurial control” tests). Out-
side of the FLSA, the most commonly used test to define “employee” is the 
common law “right to control” test, which lends special consideration to “the 
hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the [work] is 
accomplished.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 
(1989). 
229. Bartkiw, supra note 228, at 16. 
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(6) the extent to which the service integral the employer’s business.230 
Because of the number of considerations and the subjectivity of the 
“economic realities” analysis, the test is generally considered more of a 
guideline than a conclusive formulaic evaluation.231 
For present purposes, an analysis of whether workers in the 
Voluntary Work Program constitute employees will rely on the 
description of the program provided under the Performance-Based 
National Detention Standards.232 In applying those standards to the 
elements of the “economic realities” test, it is clear that the detained 
immigrant workers should be viewed as employees. 
The PBNDS empower the detention center with expansive 
control—including wage and compensation determinations, assigning 
daily tasks, and ensuring health and safety regulations—over 
detainees enrolled in the Voluntary Work Program.233 Furthermore, 
according to the PBNDS, workers must be “within sight and sound” 
of staff members, and detainees who work outside the secure 
perimeter on facility grounds must “be directly supervised at a ratio 
of no less than one staff member to four detainees.”234 This large-scale 
supervision favors the conclusion that detained immigrant workers are 
employees under the FLSA.235 
More so, facility administrators possess hiring and firing authority 
and are empowered to designate work assignments to detained work-
ers.236 The PBNDS also specifies record-keeping requirements, include-
ing an agreement that detainees must sign before commencing work 
and a reporting process if a detainee is injured on the job.237 Further-
more, a willingness to participate in the program does not guarantee 
 
230. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987). The 
economic realities test is also the primary measure under which courts 
differentiate employees from independent contractors. See id. (applying the 
listed criteria as part of the economic realities test to determine whether 
seasonal agricultural workers should be considered “employees” under the 
FLSA). 
231. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 216, at 2 (“[The economic realities test] 
should not be applied in a mechanical fashion, but with an understanding 
that the factors are indicators of the broader concept of economic depen-
dence.”). 
232. PBNDS, supra note 2, at 382–87. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 383. 
235. Cf. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1119 (6th Cir. 1984) (considering 
the fact that an employer did not closely supervise migrant farm workers 
as evidence that the workers were not statutorily protected “employees”). 
236. PBNDS, supra note 2, at 384–85. 
237. Id. at 386–87.  
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work, and a participant must discontinue their employment after re-
lease from detention.238 On the other hand, however, detained immi-
grant labor is temporary in nature, suggesting that detainees may not 
actually be sufficiently dependent on their employer to qualify as “em-
ployees” under the “economic realities” test. 
The “economic realities” test, however, also considers the costs 
and benefits that the service provides both parties. The detained 
workers have no individual investment in their work program, and the 
detention center provides all of the necessary supplies related to the 
work assignments. As such, the detained workers face no risk of loss; 
they only stand to gain from their employment. Conversely, the 
immigrant detention center remains heavily dependent on the 
Voluntary Work Program and the cheap labor that it provides. In 
fact, the PBNDS provide that one of the “expected outcomes” of the 
Voluntary Work Program is to enhance the facility’s “[e]ssential 
operations and services.”239 So while the transitory nature of the 
Voluntary Work Program may suggest that workers are not 
“employees,” the detention center’s expansive control over the 
workers and dependence on the workers’ services suggest that, under 
the totality of the circumstances, detained workers are “employees” 
under the FLSA and are entitled to minimum wage protections. 
Conclusion 
As part of his statements on the National Industry Recovery 
Act—a law passed in 1933 to stimulate economic activity following 
the Great Depression—President Roosevelt introduced public policy 
that would eventually inspire Congress to pass the FLSA.240 In the 
words of President Roosevelt: 
[N]o business which depends for existence on paying less than 
living wages to its workers has any right to continue in this 
country. By “business” I mean the whole of commerce as well as 
the whole of industry; by workers I mean all workers, the white 
collar class as well as the men in overalls; and by living wages I 
mean more than a bare subsistence level—I mean the wages of 
decent living.241 
 
238. Id. at 382–83.  
239. Id. at 382. 
240. Harris, supra note 124, at 105–09. 
241. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement on N.I.R.A.—“To Put 
People Back to Work” (June 16, 1933), in 2 The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Year of Crisis 1933, at 
251–52 (1938).  
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These remarks remain relevant today and illuminate the importance 
of the FLSA, as it applies to workers—detained and non-detained, 
immigrant and nonimmigrant—across the country. The Voluntary 
Work Program, however, undermines the underlying principles behind 
the FLSA and prioritizes the profits of the private prison industry 
over the well-being of the workers who sustain it. At the same time, 
Congress and the courts rely on antiquated laws and flawed reasoning 
to prevent the FLSA from reaching inside immigrant detention. It is 
time for courts to depart from the “immigrants-as-prisoners” 
framework and step forward to see detained immigrant workers in a 
new light—a light that recognizes the nuances of detained labor and 
the unique vulnerabilities of detained immigrants. In doing so, it 
becomes clear that the FLSA protects detained immigrant workers, 
securing the rights that comprise contemporary labor laws and touch 
the heart of the American worker. 
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